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Pursuing an Answer: Bureaucratic
and Legal Accountability in Local
Law Enforcement Pursuit
Casey LaFrance
Western Illinois University

Using qualitative and quantitative data obtained from 30 interviews with local law
enforcement managers (12 county sheriffs and 18 municipal police chiefs), this study
explores the decision-making processes used by these managers in the context of a pursuitrelated accident involving an innocent third party. My findings suggest that: (1) managers
most often conduct internal investigations to ensure that their officers’ behavior
demonstrated adherence to the agency’s standard operating procedures; (2) managers use
multiple mechanisms, including consultations with legal actors and professional peers, to
keep their pursuit policies updated with regard to case law; (3) policy restrictiveness shares
a positive, but marginal, relationship with a manager’s education level; (4) policy
restrictiveness shares a negative, but marginal, relationship with a manager’s total number
of professional association memberships; and (5) policy restrictiveness shares a significant
negative relationship with a manager’s total years of law enforcement experience.

Pursuit driving is one of the most captivating law enforcement behaviors in American
popular culture. It is also one of the most easily recognizable situations in which public
sector accountability and the phenomenon of multi-jurisdictional governance can be found.
Consider, for instance, the Fox network’s perennial run of World’s Wildest Police Videos.
Now in syndication, this show was essentially a compilation of agency-submitted videos
showcasing police officers engaged in pursuits and other dangerous situations. Pursuits
have also been fodder for news media reports, such as the recent piece written by journalist
Lara Moore detailing her experience when a simple “ride-along” with Sgt. Cullen LaFrance
of the Cumming, Georgia, Police Department turned into a “harrowing” police chase
(Moore 2008), or the televised coverage of the 1993 O. J. Simpson pursuit spectacle. This
can easily be seen as an issue to which scholars of social justice might attend, especially if
one remembers that the infamous Rodney King beating was preceded by a pursuit.
Surprisingly, scholarly attention to police pursuits has only developed recently. It is within
this realm that pursuits have been most thoroughly scrutinized, and sometimes completely
demonized.
One might begin to question why police pursuits are so intriguing. Perhaps the
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answer rests with the fact that the pursuit itself is an awesome display of law enforcement
officers’ power, manifested in their willingness to risk endangering themselves in order to
apprehend criminals. With this great power, however, comes a matching level of
responsibility because law enforcement officers involved in pursuits hold the potential to
endanger not only themselves, but also the suspects being chased and the innocent bystanders and drivers who happen to chance upon the pursuit. In fact, some scholars argue
that pursuit driving is a display of deadly force (Alpert and Friddell 1992; Alpert 1998) and
should be regulated with the same degree of caution that agencies give to shooting
decisions.
Increasingly, litigation has become a common mechanism for ensuring that a law
enforcement agency is held accountable for pursuit decisions (Becknell, Mays, and Giever
1999; Kennedy, Homant, and Kennedy 1992; Hicks 2006). Despite this surge in litigation,
Hicks’ (2006, 106) examination of the pursuit policies of 47 state police agencies in the
United States suggests that law enforcement agencies might not give adequate consideration
to the legal implications of pursuit driving, because many policies failed to mention
“elements pertaining to liability and negligence: concerns that have been demonstrated to be
instigators of liability.” This is troubling, Hicks (2007, v) asserts because “legal rulings
resulting from instances of pursuit can impact other areas of law enforcement and serve to
heighten the legal risks for most contemporary law enforcement organizations.”
Awareness of the potential effects of such legal decisions upon one’s agency is the
essence of what Romzek and Dubnick (1987) label “legal accountability”: defined as the
process by which actors outside of an agency wield the ability to impose legal sanctions on
the agency. However, employees of a law enforcement agency are also expected to
demonstrate a degree of accountability to the organization’s guiding principles, embodied in
the agency’s standard operating procedures manual. This form of accountability is what
Romzek and Dubnick (1987) label bureaucratic accountability.
In the event of a pursuit-related tragedy, these two forms of accountability seem to
conflict with one another. In these instances, local law enforcement managers must make
difficult decisions about legal accountability vis-a-vis bureaucratic accountability, the most
important of which center on: (1) the restrictiveness of the agency’s pursuit policy,
operationalized as the nature and types of offenses for which pursuits are condoned; and (2)
the sources of information by which law enforcement managers keep their pursuit policies
updated with regard to recent court decisions (Kennedy et. al. 1992).
Using qualitative data obtained from 30 interviews with local law enforcement
managers (12 county sheriffs and 18 municipal police chiefs), this study explores the
decision-making processes used by these managers in the context of a pursuit-related
accident involving an innocent third party. The key research questions guiding this
exploration are: (1) What immediate action does each manager take in the wake of a
pursuit-related accident?; (2) What mechanisms do these managers employ to ensure that
their pursuit policies are adequate and up-to-date with regard to case law changes?; and (3)
What relationships exist between geographic, demographic, and personal characteristics of a
given manager and his agency and the agency’s policy restrictiveness? After briefly
describing this chapter’s methodology and participants, I will begin to tackle these
questions.
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Method
As part of a larger project, this study uses qualitative data obtained through in-depth
interviews with 12 county sheriffs in Iowa (4), Illinois (5), and Wisconsin (3), and 18
municipal police chiefs in eight of these counties, this study explores the choice patterns of
county sheriffs and municipal police chiefs elicited from their responses to a scenario that
places legal accountability at odds with bureaucratic accountability to the agency’s standard
operating procedures (SOPs). Additionally, I will compare the mechanisms that sheriffs
and chiefs use in order to keep their policies updated. Later in the paper, I will employ
statistical techniques to explore relationships between an agency’s policy restrictiveness and
a host of variables related to an agency and its manager. Thus, this paper will leverage a
mixed methods approach to answer the research questions.
Case Selection and Process
Cases were selected based on two criteria. First, in order to hold constant any regional
effects on law enforcement decision-making, I used a purposive sampling method that
targeted sheriffs and police chiefs in three Midwestern states. Second, in order to capture
variation in decision-making based on agency size, I chose only counties with an
urbanization index (UI) score of 2 or 5 (see Table 2)
In the recruitment phase (April 2008-October 2008), I mailed cover letters, made
phone calls, and sent e-mails to 16 sheriffs and 43 police chiefs. In the end, I successfully
recruited 12 sheriffs (75% participation rate) and 18 police chiefs (42% participation rate).
Eight sheriffs came from UI-2 counties, and four sheriffs came from UI-5 counties.
Fourteen police chiefs came from UI-2 counties, and four came from UI-5 counties. Once
recruited, interviews were conducted in the managers’ offices or via telephone.
Respondent Characteristics
Out of space considerations, the most pertinent data reflecting respondent characteristics
appear in Table 1. For greater detail regarding the characteristics of individuals in the
sample, see LaFrance and Placide, 2010. Most generally, all law enforcement managers
were males. All sheriffs were Caucasian and only two chiefs were non-Caucasian (both
were African American).
The Scenario
Each manager was presented with the following scenario:
Your officer is involved in the pursuit of a fleeing felon. During the course of this pursuit,
the felon loses control of his vehicle and crashes into an uninvolved bystander vehicle. The
driver of this uninvolved vehicle now wants to sue your department. What do you do?
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Table 1: Average Respondent Characteristics of Sheriffs and Chiefs

54
Ran
ge
4561

HS
diploma:
1
AA
Degree:
2
BA
Degree:
7
MA
Degree:
2

7
Range
:
1-16

2.5

Police
Chief

51
Ran
ge:
3864

HS

4.5
Range:
2
months27
Years

2.28

2.39

Education
Distribution

Sheriff

Diploma

:1
Some
College
:1
AA
Degree:
1
BA
Degree:
7
MA
Degree:
7
PhD
Degree:
1
JD
Degree:
1

Median
Years
in

Mean Total
Training
(State +
Local +
National +
Workshops)

Mean Total
Professional
Association
Memberships
(National +
State + Local)
2.5

Mean Age

Type of
Mgr

Current
Position
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Table 2: Urbanization Index Scores of Respondents
County
Score
5
2
5
2
2
5
2
2
2
2
5
2
Source: 2003 USDA Urban Influence Codes
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/UrbanInfluenceCodes/2003/

Results
Managers’ Scenario Responses (see Table 3)
When presented with the scenario, most managers (20/30, or 66%) explained that they
would conduct an internal investigation to ensure that the pursuing officers followed each
department’s pursuit policy. Two of these 20 managers also claimed that they would review
the agency’s pursuit policy. An additional two managers simply suggested that they would
review the policy, but did not mention an internal review. Three other managers suggested
that they would take no action. Instead, these three suggested, they would rely on the
soundness of their pursuit policy and would let their departments’ insurance companies
handle the lawsuit. Two other chiefs (from the same county) explained that an outside, state
level, agency would review the pursuit. Finally, two other chiefs (from another county)
suggested that they would publicly blame the suspect for the injuries sustained by the
uninvolved third party. However, these final two chiefs conceded that it was doubtful that
the city attorneys or the departments’ legal counsel would allow them to speak openly about
the incident.
Table 3: Scenario Responses
Internal

Review

investigation

policy

Chiefs

12

4

Sheriffs

10

1

Type of
manager

No action
(rely on
policy and
insurance)

Publicly
blame
suspect

2

Outside
review
(DCI,
state
patrol,
etc.)
2

1

0

0

2

Note: Some chiefs gave more than one response.
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Mechanisms Used to Keep Policies Updated (see Table 4)
With all due respect to these two exceptional rationales, one can safely conclude that the
creation and revision of detailed pursuit policies are commonly undertaken in order to
ameliorate potential legal liability among managers in this sample. With this in mind, each
manager was asked to describe the methods he uses to ensure that his pursuit policies (and
all other policies) are effective in minimizing legal liability. Managers’ responses to this
question fall within eight broad categories (see Table 4). Because most managers cited
multiple mechanisms used to ensure the policies were adequate and timely (with regard to
current case law), I have ranked each mechanism by the order each manager mentioned it.
Independently reviewing case law. As Table 4 shows, 19 managers suggested that
they look at case law changes on their own, whether by subscribing to a database of case law
such as WestLaw or regularly meeting with members of their command staff. Twelve of
these managers cited this as the number one mechanism of keeping their policies up to date
and six cited this as the second most commonly used mechanism.
Professional association information. Thirteen managers suggested that they rely
on information sent out by professional associations (e.g., memos and bulletins),
professional conferences, external training seminars, and professional associations’ legal
staffs to ensure that they are adequately ensconced from litigation. Seven managers
mentioned this mechanism first, five mentioned it second, and one mentioned it third.
Local government attorneys. Seven managers claimed that they seek advice from
county or city attorneys and agencies’ legal staffs to keep their policies updated. One
manager mentioned this first, five mentioned it second, and one mentioned it third. Only
one manager claimed that he hired private attorneys to review his policies and keep him
informed of changes in case law. This was his most important (first mentioned) source of
protection from liability.
Accreditation and alternatives. Six managers cited accreditation as a shield from
litigation, explaining that the accreditation body requires an annual review of all policies.
Four managers mentioned this mechanism first and two mentioned it second. Though he
cited the role of the accreditation body as the primary mechanism used to protect the agency
from liability, one of these managers expressed disdain for accreditation and advised that he
will not renew the department’s accreditation. Two other managers cited an alternative
mechanism to accreditation, contracting with a risk management corporation, as their first
and second most important liability shields. The use of a risk management company, these
managers argued, provides all the liability protection that accreditation brings but it is
substantially more affordable and it does not constrain managers’ decision-making or
mandate uniformity. Three other managers have developed another alternative to
accreditation by hiring at least one officer in each department whose sole responsibilities
are: (1) monitoring case law changes, (2) suggesting revisions to the standard operating
procedures manual, and (3) conducting internal training based on these revisions.
Additionally, two managers suggested that they regularly network with other local law
enforcement managers in their counties, regions, and states to discuss policy changes.
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Seek advice from
county/city attorneys
and legal staff

Hire officer dedicated
to monitoring case law
changes

Rely on professional
associations’ bulletins,
memos, conferences,
training, and legal staffs

Look at case law changes
on their own (subscribe to
West Law, etc.) on a
regular basis

Rank
1st: 1

Rank
1st: 0
Rank
2nd: 1

Rank
1st: 1

0

Rank
1st: 1

Rank 1st:
1
Rank
2nd: 4
Rank 3rd:
1
Rank 1st:
0
Rank
2nd: 1

Rank
1st: 1
Rank
2nd: 0
Rank
3rd: 1
Rank
1st: 1

Rank 1st:
3
Rank 2nd:
2
Rank 3rd:
1
Rank 1st:
4
Rank 2nd:
3

Rank 1st:
7
Rank
2nd: 3
Rank 3rd:
1
Rank 1st:
5
Rank
2nd: 3

Network with other
chiefs and sheriffs

Contract with risk
management company

Rank
1st: 3
Rank
2nd: 2

Accreditation

Hire private lawyer(s)

Sheriffs

Chiefs

Type of manager

Table 4: Mechanisms Used to Ensure Policies are Adequate and Timely
Note: One chief did not mention any mechanism

Rank
1st: 1

Rank
1st: 0
Rank
2nd: 1

The Use of These Mechanisms
Foremost, one might handily draw the conclusion that the development and implementation
of a pursuit policy are goals that the local law enforcement managers in this sample consider
important enough to devote considerable time to fulfilling. One might also begin to see that
writing a pursuit policy is not a one-time endeavor. In fact, these policies are constantly
being revised and amended so that they are within the boundaries of current case law. These
responses also demonstrate that, in addition to the manager’s perceived obligation to remain
informed about case law changes, court decisions, and other relevant data, he often feels an
obligation to complement his own research with the advice of knowledgeable outsiders as
well as his professional peers.
Table 4 shows that law enforcement managers often engage the aid of county and
city attorneys, legal staffs, risk management corporations, and private attorneys in
formulating policy. It is unsurprising that these managers would attempt to enhance their
legal accountability by consulting with these actors and groups. It seems, too, that
consulting with these sources of advice is a less expensive and less constraining choice than
seeking and obtaining accreditation. Another potential benefit of seeking policy advice from
these legal actors, especially in the cases of risk management corporations and private
attorneys, is that doing so helps to diffuse legal responsibility in the aftermath of a pursuitrelated accident.
In addition to consulting legal experts for help with writing policies, managers’
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responses indicate that they also frequently receive legal advice from those outside the legal
profession in at least three formal ways: (1) through memoranda and bulletins from
professional associations to which they belong, (2) through their own and their subordinates’
formal training, and (3) through accreditation bodies; and at least one informal method:
through networking and conversing with other managers. Thus, the law enforcement
managers in this sample seem to engage in what Frederickson (1999, 708) calls
“administrative conjunction,” defined as “the array and character of horizontal formal and
informal association between actors representing units in a networked public and the
administrative behavior of these actors.”
Administrative Conjunction
Essentially, administrative conjunction occurs because problems often cross jurisdictional
boundaries. Police pursuits provide an excellent example of the need for cooperation
between law enforcement managers from different agencies because pursuits can begin in
one jurisdiction and carry on through others before they are finally terminated. One sheriff
explained that this possibility motivated him to work with the chiefs of municipal police
departments within his county to craft very similar pursuit policies, agreeing on certain
aspects of pursuit behavior by their officers, so that everyone involved in the pursuit would
be “on the same page” with regard to pursuit behavior. In fact, at least one agency in a
neighboring state joined in on the formulation of these tenets. The sheriff explained:
The pursuit policy [at my agency] came from my involvement with the [X-region]
police administrators, made up of [5 other managers and myself]. We meet every
month and work together to get grants for such things as public safety software.
One of the ideas we had was a pursuit policy that is very similar throughout all of
these agencies… because by the nature of a pursuit, it will be going through
different jurisdictions. If [City 1] had a policy that was very different from [City
2], and [City 2] had a policy that was very different from the county’s policy….our
officers crossing jurisdictions would become very confused about what they could
and could not do. So, we tried to model…not necessarily a county-wide policy, but
a very similar one…that way, all of our people who are out working together are
kind of on the same page and they know what everybody is supposed to be doing
and what everybody is not supposed to be doing. They have their policy and I have
my policy, but they’re very similar.
It is important to note that neither (1) participation in this group nor (2) agreeing to
the policy tenets the group decided on is compulsory. None of the managers involved in the
group wield any coercive power over the others. Instead, the group relies on the power of
persuasion and peer pressure described in the literature of international diplomacy as “soft
power” (Nye1990; 2004; Slaughter 2005). Similar demonstrations of soft power occur
through the other conduits mentioned above: accreditation and professional associations, and
the formulation of very similar policy wording are not limited to pursuit driving.
Indeed, one could list several other instances when cooperation between agencies and
different levels of government are absolutely imperative to meaningful criminal interdiction
by law enforcement agencies. Examples include, but are certainly not limited to: drug
trafficking, stolen goods trafficking, and gang activity. With the growth of information
technology, especially the Internet, even greater possibilities arise for multi-jurisdictional
criminal behavior. As a result, conjunctive behavior between law enforcement agencies is
necessary if police chiefs and sheriffs hope to be successful in disrupting such activity.
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The Holistic Nature of Accountability
Taken as a whole, managers’ consultation of groups and actors outside of the legal
profession, but within the law enforcement profession, demonstrate the interrelated nature of
public sector accountability streams. In this instance, accountability to the law enforcement
profession (professional accountability) leads to the development of reliable standard
operating procedures. Allegiance to these standard operating procedures (bureaucratic
accountability) then serves to ensure that the agency is shielded from court losses, or is
accountable to the court system and exogenous legal actors and groups who otherwise might
attempt to impose legal sanctions upon the agency (legal accountability). Perhaps, too, a
benefit of having a well-developed pursuit policy is the avoidance of public outrage that
might result from the consequences of unrestricted pursuit behavior (political
accountability).
Despite their best efforts, many of the managers in my sample have cited examples
where policies alone could not save lives. In the next section, I consider the painful truth
that no matter how well thought-out and well-written an agency’s pursuit policy may be,
even the most justified pursuits have resulted in tragedy.
Can Pursuit Policies be Perfected?
While these managers’ responses might cause a reader to reflect upon the painstaking
measures that law enforcement executives take to shield themselves from liability, the
dynamics of the policy—creation-review-revision—cycle also highlights the fact that none
of the managers in this study have been able to create a perfect pursuit policy. One
manager, after moments of silence and, I imagine, deep reflection, explained, “You do the
same thing 100 times and you get the results that are good and the last time [things go
wrong].” This chief went on to describe a recent occurrence in his city, involving the
county’s sheriff’s department, where the officer in question was not engaged in a pursuit.
Instead, this officer was simply responding to a call. With slow, deliberate, and emotiontinged language, the chief explained:
You know, we just don’t have the pursuits here that you would expect. Actually we
had one of the deputies here on a straight emergency run, you know, just a lights
and sirens type run, crossed the street and it’s still going through the process, he
hit… T-boned and killed a girl back in October. He is [a] thirty-year veteran and
was going to retire now. You know we did everything we did the reconstruction,
we called the state in and interviewed the witnesses, and presented the case to this
DA. He exempted himself and the case is going to a DA two counties over. We
have charged him with reckless homicide. It’s the same basic…if its legally
justified but the risk outweighs the benefit analysis that you need to go
through…whatever you’re doing if you go through a red light regardless of lights
and sirens by state statute you’re still responsible for your action. You know you
need the standard by which the decision was made. You had the right to go through
the intersection but it is going to be judged. Was it a reasonable and prudent thing
to do? Could you have stopped? If you go through that intersection and you have
contact…the guy was going fifty-two miles an hour at the point of impact, and
something I have been told anecdotally was that the history of the department was
they always drive fast. I mean if you’re forty miles away from your back up and
they’re at a domestic, you know, they drove fast. That was what you got because
- 47 -
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you felt you were protecting and saving lives. You know a guy said when he came
for an observation the other night, that going fifty-two miles an hour was cutting
the speeds they used to drive at in half. You know so he had had the effect of the
change. The tragic part is you are not above the law, you trained it, you knew it,
should have known it. You know and you know, all you can do is you go through
your criminal investigation and make sure it is a neutral party, in that case the
county had us investigate it, and we called in the state for reconstruction expertise.
Another chief shared how the need to update his department’s pursuit policy
became apparent after a tragic pursuit outcome 15 years earlier. Here, he tells of this tragic
occurrence and the impact that it had on the department’s standard operating procedures for
pursuits:
Nothing is more near and dear to the [city’s name] police department than the issue
of pursuit. We lost an officer 15 years ago in a pursuit. He was pursuing a nonfelony [offender who was] doing doughnuts in the street. The supervisor should’ve
discontinued the pursuit, but this officer was approaching the car and a non-contact
car all of a sudden appeared. The officer lost control and hit a telephone pole and
was killed instantly. He had a 5 month old baby at home and a 3 year old, as well
as a wife. He was 29 years old. The [city’s name] police department is very
concerned about our pursuit policy. We had been a department since 1889, and
prior to this incident, the last time we had an officer killed was in 1926 when an
officer was shot by a bootlegger. Between 1926 and 1993, we were involved in
hundreds of pursuits where nobody got hurt until this happened. This caused my
predecessor, the former chief, to review pursuit policy from top down.
Yet another manager, a county sheriff, explained that a pursuit does not have to be
conducted a high rates of speed to be dangerous. Here, he described an incident in which
two of his officers were pursuing a vehicle at moderate speeds. The fleeing suspect cut out
his headlights and ended up crashing into a van with 4 university coeds. The impact of the
collision killed the van’s driver, “made a paraplegic out of another passenger,” and injured
the other two. The fleeing driver, however, was unscathed.
Policy Restrictiveness
The literature concerning police pursuits identifies three types of pursuit policies, based on
the degree to which these policies allow officers in a given agency to pursue fleeing
offenders, based largely on offense type, e.g., misdemeanor, soft felony, forcible felony, etc.
(Fennessy et al. 1970; Alpert and Dunham 1989). These categories are important because
previous research indicates that the “most influential factor” that officers consider in
deciding whether to continue a pursuit is “the offense for which the suspect is wanted”
(Alpert 1998, 347), and one can reasonably expect policy restrictiveness to be a
manifestation of a given agency’s attention to legal liability concerns.
Judgmental Policies
The first category of pursuit policies, judgmental, is the least restrictive. This type of policy
allows officers almost absolute discretion in deciding whether they will pursue a given
offender. Two respondents in this study, both county sheriffs, described their policies in a
way that can be categorized as judgmental.

- 48 -

http://digitalscholarship.bjmlspa.tsu.edu/rbjpa/vol3/iss1/4

10

LaFrance: Pursuing an Answer: Bureaucratic and Legal Account
Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs

Spring 2014

Restrictive Policies
The second category of pursuit policies, restrictive, limits an officer’s discretion in choosing
whether to pursue by limiting the types of offense that are deemed worthy of pursuit.
Generally speaking, restrictive policies only allow pursuits of offenders accused of
committing forcible felonies rather than non-violent felony offenses. Fourteen respondents
described their pursuit policies as fitting into this category (see Table 5).
Discouragement Policies
The final category of pursuit policies, discouragement, strictly limits pursuits to situations in
which greater harm is likely to be caused to citizens if there is no pursuit (e.g., pursuing a
mass murderer or someone who has kidnapped a child). Thirteen managers described their
pursuit policies in ways that could be categorized as discouragement (see Table 5).
One manager, who was actively revising his agency’s pursuit policy at the time of
the interview, was unable to provide a description of his policy that fit any of the three
categories. Subsequently, his responses to other items will be omitted from the analyses that
follow.
Table 5: Policy Restrictiveness
Type of
manager
Chiefs
Sheriffs

Judgmental

Restrictive

Discouragement

0

9

8

2

5

5

Note: One chief did not describe his pursuit policy. He is currently writing a new one.
Correlates of Policy Restrictiveness
Past research has explored correlates of the amount of restriction written into law
enforcement agencies’ pursuit policies. For instance, in a study of the pursuit policies of 23
city police agencies and 47 state police and state patrol agencies, Kennedy, Homant, and
Kennedy (1992) find that, while the content of pursuit policies varies substantially,
municipal police agencies in their study were much more likely to restrict officer discretion
in pursuits than were state police agencies. Kennedy et al. (1992, 242) also found that: (1)
the amount of detail with which a policy is written shares a minor relationship (R=.24;
p=.05) with the overall restrictiveness of the policy; (2) there is a positive, but statistically
insignificant (R=.26; p=.30) relationship between population density and the restrictiveness
of an agency’s pursuit policy; (3) and no relationship between the policies of a given state
and cities within this state.
Testing These Correlates
While I have not analyzed the level of detail in the pursuit policies of the 30 agencies
in my sample, I can offer a modest comparison of the latter two findings with the data I have
collected, albeit with some slight variations. First, rather than using Kennedy, et. al.’s
(1992) 5-point scale of pursuit restriction, I will use Fennessey, et. al.’s (1970) 3-point scale,
which classifies pursuit policies according to the three categories described above. Second,
rather than using population density, I will use the USDA’s county-level urban influence
data. Finally, rather than using state police agencies as my comparison group, I will
- 49 -
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compare the policies of county sheriffs’ departments with those of municipal police
departments.
Propositions
I expect that my findings will match Kennedy, et. al.’s (1992) findings with regard to policy
restrictiveness and urbanization, though my results might reach statistical significance.
Because municipal and county law enforcement managers have more opportunities to meet
and discuss common goals, I expect that the relationship between municipal police agencies’
policies and the policies of county sheriffs’ departments in paired counties will be stronger
than the relationship these researchers found between state-level and municipal pursuit
policies.
Findings
In line with Kennedy et al.’s (1992) findings, the relationship between county urban
influence code and the restrictiveness of an agency’s pursuit policy is insignificant, but is in
the expected direction (in this case, negative, since smaller counties are given larger UI
codes). Also in line with the Kennedy team, I find no relationship between policy
restrictiveness and sharing the same county among those agencies in the same counties. In
fact, only one of the eight groups of agencies who share a county had the same level of
restrictiveness in every agency. Even when the county sheriff’s office is excluded from the
analysis and only counties with multiple police agencies are included, there is no
relationship between host county and pursuit policy restrictiveness.
Despite anecdotal evidence from at least one county, the data do not support the
assertion that administrative conjunction aimed at formulating very similar pursuit policies
is occurring on a large-scale between local law enforcement managers based in the same
county. This is disheartening, given the potential benefits of conjunctive behavior in law
enforcement iterated above. Perhaps, though, conjunction does take place but is carried out
in more formal settings. To test this possibility, I will next consider measures of association
between the restrictiveness of an agency’s policy (coded 1 for judgmental, 2 for restrictive,
and 3 for discouragement) with indicators of engagement in these formal organizations (total
professional association memberships, total training, and education, and accreditation).
Table (6) shows some promise for the argument that administrative conjunction
occurring through at least one formal conduit serves to unify the tenets of pursuit policy
among multiple agencies. While a manager’s total training shares no relationship with the
restrictiveness of his agency’s pursuit policy, the manager’s education level does share a
positive relationship with policy restrictiveness, though this relationship is significant only
at the .10 p-level.
When considering the total number of professional associations to which a manager
belongs, however, the relationship of this variable to policy restrictiveness is marginally
significant (p<.09) in the opposite direction than expected. The only potential explanation I
can provide for this finding is that the manager might be receiving conflicting policy advice
from multiple professional associations at once, thus precluding the manager from making
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Table 6 Measures of Association for Policy Restrictiveness
Independent Variables
Sheriff (1, 0)

Policy
restrictiveness
-.148

Significance
level
.434

Age

-.246

.189

Years in current position

-.210

.266

Years in this agency

-.163

.389

Total years in law enforcement

-.383*

.040

Total professional association memberships

-.316†

.090

Accreditation

.037

.844

Total training

.096

.615

Sworn employee ratio

.141

.458

Total employees

-.169

.373

Education

.307*

.099

Note. Measure of association was Spearman’s Rho.
*p < .05. † < .10.
his policy more restrictive. This makes sense theoretically because the need for multiple
professional associations would dissipate if each association advocated for the same values
and policies.
Accreditation status does not share a relationship with policy restrictiveness at all.
This non-finding might be explained by the fact that only six agencies in the sample were
accredited.
The strongest relationship I have found is the negative association between a
manager’s total years in law enforcement and the restrictiveness of his pursuit policy. This
seems counterintuitive because one might expect a long-serving manager to be more
cognizant of rulings about pursuit liability, or to be more familiar with negative outcomes
associated with pursuits. However, one might also theorize that longer-serving managers
might still operate with the same sense of liability that was common when they began their
careers. This is possible because they might also be more detached from academy training,
field training, and formal education than their younger counterpart managers.
Most interestingly, in terms of the larger project, is that no significant differences in
policy restrictiveness could be found between county sheriffs and municipal police chiefs.
This finding is what one might expect to find, since legal liability has an equal impact on
each type of manger. Thus, sheriffs and chiefs might be just as likely to attempt to
safeguard themselves from courtroom proceedings related to flaws in their policies.
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Conclusion and Future Research Suggestions
Every manager in this sample expressed a strong interest in the development of sound
pursuit policies. All but two of these managers explained that the primary motivation for
doing so was protecting themselves and their agencies from legal liability arising out of an
inadequate policy. In the aftermath of a tragedy resulting from a pursuit, most of these
managers were driven to conduct an internal investigation in order to gauge how strictly
their officer adhered to the policy manual; an indication of the agency’s level of bureaucratic
accountability.
However, these managers also explained that they continuously consult with actors
and groups in the legal and law enforcement professions in order to revise these policies so
that they do not become stagnant with regard to changes in case law, and subsequently
enhance the agency’s vulnerability to lawsuits. Thus, this microcosm of policy development
in law enforcement agencies shows that at least three accountability streams, professional,
legal, and bureaucratic, work in concert to produce positive outcomes for the agency, the
profession, and those who might be endangered in a police pursuit.
Unfortunately, this long-term symbiosis does not always come without a short-term
price tag in the event that an agency is caught unaware with a lackluster pursuit policy.
Presently, there is no universal pursuit policy used by all local law enforcement agencies.
More vexing is the fact that this is probably for the best, as each manager must consider his
own internal and external environments, resource constraints, and societal expectations
when crafting a policy. Indeed, one might just as readily criticize a police chief or county
sheriff for his reticence to engage in a hot pursuit to catch a bad guy as one might criticize
the manager for any negative externality resulting from a less restrictive pursuit policy.
An example of these multi-directional pulling forces on the manager comes from
preliminary measures of association that show marginally significant relationships between
education and policy restriction, in a positive direction, and total professional association
memberships and policy restriction, in a negative direction. It could be the case that
professional associations and formal educational institutions are giving disparate advice to
the local law enforcement manager about crafting a pursuit policy.
These data indicate, too, that longer-serving managers are least likely to have
restrictive pursuit policies. A critic might assert that this finding demonstrates a need for
more recently trained and educated managers who might be more likely to focus on the
newer realities of pursuit liability. Others might argue, instead, that these longer-serving
managers are more concerned with carrying out their professional duties than placating
lawyers and judges or selling out to civil juries. To get at the heart of this finding, future
research should explore this trend.
Perhaps the most important finding to carry away from this study rests in the notion
of administrative conjunction between local law enforcement managers facing common
problems. While my findings suggest that such conjunction does not always lead to policy
agreement, there is tremendous potential in formal and informal conjunctive endeavors to
tackle a host of policy concerns that have ripened with the boom in information technology
and a decline of jurisdictional relevance. This phenomenon deserves its own study, outside
of the context of one type of policy, in order to see if it is effective in manifesting common
goals (if not common policies) between multiple agencies.
Given the ubiquity of pursuits involving minorities, future research should also ask
whether some pursuits are a direct result of racial profiling. This research question fits into a
larger body of literature on the disproportionate interactions, and subsequent incarceration,
- 52 -

http://digitalscholarship.bjmlspa.tsu.edu/rbjpa/vol3/iss1/4

14

LaFrance: Pursuing an Answer: Bureaucratic and Legal Account
Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs

Spring 2014

of African Americans, especially males, known in the scholarly community as the “new Jim
Crow” (Alexander, 2012). Some preliminary research has begun on the relationship between
pursuits and racial profiling; especially those depicted in “reality” television shows such as
COPS and World’s Wildest Police Videos, leading Prosise and Johnson (2004) to argue that
these television shows implicitly endorse racial profiling. As with many studies of police
pursuit policy, a final caveat is in order. Kennedy and his colleagues (1992) remind the
reader that the written policy, no matter how much effort goes into crafting it, is only as
realistic as the unwritten policy, as found in the actual behavior of officers.
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